

Pejoratives, Contexts and Presuppositions  
Context in Philosophy  
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  - (iii) The difficulty to articulate the alleged property suggest that there is more to it than contributing to **description** and **classification**.



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- It is a confounding factor that Homs follows Bach (1999) in using *what is said* in the **locutionary** sense.
- Here Williamson's proposal is accepted as an alternative to Hom's and developed **only** taking both relative to the **Gricean** sense of *saying*.



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- **Constitutive** difference: P, **requirements on the common ground**; CI: **merely** not-at-issue, **backgrounded content**.
- **Standard** differences: Failure of P **makes what is said neither true nor false**, unless P is **accommodated**; projection (“**filtering**”) behavior.

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  - ▶ Nor why **this is so when it is clear that the speaker lacks the attitude**.

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- This still fails; contrast (7) with (8):

(7) # Nobody infected the PC; it was John who infected it

(8) Catalan people are not contemptible at all, they have built a better society than we have; I just invited a few polacos to a party

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  - (9) Someone infected the PC; in fact it was John who infected it.
- Not so the ones for pejoratives proposed by Schlenker, Macià and Cepollaro & Stojanovic:
  - (10) I believe that Catalan people are worth of contempt; in fact I avoid social interactions with polacos as much as I can.
  - (11) We (the speakers of the present context) are prepared to treat Catalan people with contempt; in fact we avoid social interactions with polacos as much as we can.
  - (12) Catalan people are worthy of contempt; in fact we avoid social interactions with polacos as much as we can.

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    - ★ One part for the *question under discussion* (Roberts, 2012), another for the *plans or things to do* for the audience (Portner, 2016).

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  - ▶ It captures **the normative features of the use of pejoratives**, and it explains why **it is not easy to articulate their meanings descriptively**.

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  - (14) # A has been requested to take S to the bank; in fact you wait for us at the door.
- Filtering appears to be specific to *presuppositions that go to the cognitive record*.
  - ▶ This should be explained on account of the semantics of the relevant operators, 'if', 'and', 'or'.



## Why Filtering Doesn't Work

The proposal also deals adequately with the **filtering objection**.

- As Roberts (2012) shows for questions and Portner (2016) for commands, both validate presuppositions further on in the discourse.
- Including presuppositions of later questions and commands, which in their turn contribute to change the relevant context-sets.
- But the presuppositions they generate cannot be *filtered* either:
  - (12) You take us to the bank.
  - (13) You wait for us at the door, with the engine running.
  - (14) # A has been requested to take S to the bank; in fact you wait for us at the door.
- Filtering appears to be specific to *presuppositions that go to the cognitive record*.
  - ▶ This should be explained on account of the semantics of the relevant operators, 'if', 'and', 'or'.
- Cepollaro & Stojanovic claim that filtering doesn't occur with the  $\phi$ -presuppositions of pronouns; but it does:
  - (15) If that person were female, she would be popular among boys.

## Thanks! & Some References

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